Seminar 208, Microeconomic Theory: Informal Elections with Dispersed Information

Header section: []
Submitted: []
Submitted by Brandon Eltiste on November 23, 2021
Event info: []
Online via Zoom
Event Type:
Monday, November 29, 2021 - 16:10
About this Event

Mehmet Ekmekci, Boston College

We study information transmission through informal elections: Informed agents send binary messages to a receiver who chooses a policy. Our leading example is protests in which there may be positive costs or benefits of participation. The aggregate turnout provides information to a policy maker. However, the presence of activists who obtain direct benefits from participation adds noise to the turnout. The interplay between noise and participation costs leads to strategic substitution and complementarity effects in citizens’ participation choices, and we characterize the implications for the informativeness of protests.