This course has been reorganized relative to earlier years. I still make use a lot of the book by T. Persson and G. Tabellini “Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy”, MIT PRESS 2000 which synthesizes the large literature that has been growing analyzing the interaction between economic and political processes. However, I have reorganized the course in a way that I think is better, followingless individual chapters but organized more by class of models when appropriate.

Students are supposed to do the problem sets after each lecture. The exam will be based on problem sets.

Lecture 1. From Social Choice to Political Economics.


Problem set: given in class.

Lectures 2, 3 and 4. Median voter models, their applicability and applications to general interest politics.


Other readings:


**Lecture 5. Probabilistic models of voting.**


**Lecture 6 and 7. Agency models of politics.**


**Lecture 8. Partisan Politicians.**


**Lecture 9, 10 and 11. Special Interest Politics.**


Lecture 12. Political Regimes.

Persson-Tabellini (2000): chapter 10


Lectures 13: Democratization.


Students are recommended to read other chapters of the book.

GRADE: 1/4 based on problem sets delivered on time, ¾ final exam based on problem sets.