Do not turn the page until instructed to.
Do not forget to write Problems 1 and 2 in Blue Book A and Problems 3 and 4 in the second Blue Book B.
Problem 1. Prisoner Dilemma Game with Altruism (40 points) Consider the standard Prisoner Dilemma game that we discussed in class. As you remember, the story is one of two prisoners, each of which has to choose between defecting (that is, confessing) and not defecting (keeping the mouth shut). The payoffs indicate the number of years in prison:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defection</th>
<th>No Defection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defection</td>
<td>−4, −4</td>
<td>−1, −5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Defection</td>
<td>−5, −1</td>
<td>−2, −2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1. Write the general definition of Nash Equilibrium. (3 points)

2. Using this definition, compute all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game (that is, do not allow for probability distributions). (3 points)

3. Now comes the interesting part of the problem. Unlike in the classroom discussion, the prisoners are altruistic. The utility function of player 1 is a function both of his own payoff in years, \( \pi_1 \), but also of the payoff of player 2, \( \pi_2 \). Thus, player one’s utility is: 

\[
U_1 = \pi_1 + \alpha \pi_2,
\]

with \( \alpha \geq 0 \). Similarly for player 2: 

\[
U_2 = \pi_2 + \alpha \pi_1.
\]

Briefly explain why the parameter \( \alpha \) captures altruism, and discuss the special cases \( \alpha = 0 \) and \( \alpha = 1 \). (4 points)

4. This implies that the matrix can be rewritten in terms of utility as

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defection</td>
<td>−4(1 + \alpha), −4(1 + \alpha)</td>
<td>−1 − 5\alpha, −5 − \alpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Defection</td>
<td>−5 − \alpha, −1 − 5\alpha</td>
<td>−2(1 + \alpha), −2(1 + \alpha)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compute all the mixed-strategy equilibria of this new game, as a function of \( \alpha \), assuming \( \alpha \geq 0 \). Call \( u \) (for Up) the probability that player 1 defects and \( l \) (for Left) the probability that player 2 defects. Discuss intuitively why altruism makes a difference — or does not make a difference — in this game. (15 points)

5. Under what values of \( \alpha \) is \( (s_1^* = \text{No Defection}, s_2^* = \text{No Defection}) \) an equilibrium in dominant strategies for this game? State clearly the definition of Dominant Strategy equilibrium and how it differs from Nash Equilibrium. (7 points)

6. Now let’s go back to the standard case with no altruism (\( \alpha = 0 \)), but assume that the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is played twice, instead of once. That is, the game is repeated once. Each time, the matrix of payoffs above applies. Debate this assertion: “If the prisoners meet twice, we will observe the No Defection equilibrium even in the absence of altruism because the repetition provides an opportunity for” Use backwards induction and be as precise as you can about your statements. (8 points)
Problem 2. Wisdom tooth removal and asymmetric information (70 points) Wisdom teeth are usually removed early in life as a preventive measure, to avoid problems that may happen in the future. It is more costly to remove the teeth once the problems have begun.

Suppose there are two types of wisdom teeth: those that are more likely to lead to problems in the future (“bad” teeth) and those that are less likely to lead to problems (“good” teeth). Specifically, assume a good set of teeth has a 10% chance of problems and a bad set of teeth has a 60% chance of problems. All future problems will cost $500 to solve. However, if the wisdom teeth are removed early in life the probability of future problems is 0. There are $N$ patients with wisdom teeth in Berkeley.

Assume the consumer does not discount between periods and has utility directly equal to his wealth: $u(x) = x$. Notice that this means he is risk-neutral.

Suppose there is only one oral surgeon in Berkeley, and she operates as a monopolist in wisdom tooth removal. She faces marginal cost $100 of removing any set of wisdom teeth, whether they are good or bad teeth.

1. How much is an individual willing to pay for the removal of a good set of wisdom teeth? And for the removal of a bad set of wisdom teeth? (4 points)

2. First-best scenario: If consumers can identify whether their wisdom teeth are good or bad, what will the oral surgeon monopolist set as the price for removing wisdom teeth ($p_{FB}$), and which type(s) of teeth will be removed? (6 points)

3. How much profit will the oral surgeon monopolist make per set of wisdom teeth? (5 points)

4. Hidden type scenario: Now, suppose individuals cannot tell whether their teeth are good or bad, but they know that across the population, $\frac{2}{5}$ of all peoples teeth are “bad”. Solve for the expected benefit to an individual of removing his wisdom teeth, given his (correct) beliefs about the likelihood of each type. (5 points)

5. Given the expected benefit you found above, what price ($p_{HT}$) will the monopolist charge to remove a set of wisdom teeth when teeth have hidden type? Which type(s) of teeth will be removed in equilibrium? (4 points)

6. Calculate the profit of the monopolist in this case (hidden type) and compare it to his profits in the case above (first best). (Remember that there are $N$ patients, and $\frac{2}{5}$ of them have bad wisdom teeth.) Which case does she prefer? Interpret. (6 points)

7. What about the consumers? compare the aggregate expected utility of all $N$ consumers in the hidden type case with the aggregate in the first-best case. Which case is better, in aggregate? (5 points)

8. Assume now that there is perfect competition in the market for wisdom tooth removal. Specifically, assume that there is an infinite supply of doctors, all of which face marginal cost $100 of removing a set of wisdom teeth, and that they compete on price $p_{PC}$. What is the price $p_{PC}$ charged for wisdom teeth removal? Compute it for both the first-best scenario and the hidden-type scenario. (10 points)

9. Still on perfect competition: What is the aggregate expected utility of consumers in the two scenarios (first-best versus hidden-type)? Explain the differences with the monopoly case (5 points)

10. (Harder) Now let’s go back to the monopoly case. Without solving mathematically, explain whether the difference $p_{FB} - p_{HT}$ would increase or decrease if consumers were risk-averse. (10 points)

11. Lastly, still in the monopoly case, but without risk-aversion, suppose the share of bad teeth is not $\frac{2}{5}$ but some fraction $q \in (0, 1)$. Determine the range of values $q$ such that in equilibrium, no wisdom teeth are removed. (10 points)
Problem 3. Search effort (40 points.) We consider in this problem the decision by an unemployed worker of how much effort to put into searching for a job. The unemployed worker chooses the search effort $e \in [0,1]$. With probability $e$, the worker receives a job offer that provides utility (from wages and other benefits, etc) of $w > 0$, while with probability $1 - e$ the worker receives no job offer and receives only unemployment benefits, which provides utility of $b$ (with $w > b > 0$). In other words, the probability of receiving a job offer is directly proportional to the job-search effort of the worker. The disutility of searching is $-c(e)$, with $c(0) = 0$ and $c'(e) > 0$ for all $e$.

1. The worker is an expected utility maximizer. Write the expected utility taking into account that the expected utility is the sum of the expected utility of money (wage $w$ or benefit $b$) plus the disutility cost of searching. (5 points)

2. Under what conditions is the expected utility (strictly) concave in $e$? Discuss the economic interpretation. Maintain this assumption in what follows. (5 points)

3. The worker maximizes the expected utility with respect to effort $e$. Derive the first order condition with respect to $e$. (5 points)

4. Using the implicit function theorem, show that the optimal effort $e^*$ (i) is increasing in the wage $w$; (ii) is decreasing in the unemployment benefits $b$. Discuss the intuition for each results. (10 points)

5. Now assume that the agent is risk averse with utility function $x^{1-\rho}/(1-\rho)$. Remember that $\rho$ is the risk-aversion parameter, the higher $\rho$, the more risk averse the agent is (Assume $\rho > 0$) In our context, this implies that the utility of finding a job is now $w^{1-\rho}/(1-\rho)$ instead of $w$ and similarly the utility of being unemployed is now $b^{1-\rho}/(1-\rho)$ instead of $b$. Nothing else changes. Write the new expected utility that the consumer maximizes and derive the first order condition (5 points)

6. Again using the implicit function theorem, show how the optimal effort $e^*$ changes as the risk aversion level $\rho$ increases. Provide an explanation. [Notice: This is a somewhat counter-intuitive result] (10 points)
Problem 4. General equilibrium with taxes. (75 points) Now we look at an economy with one consumer and two goods, and consider what happens in general equilibrium when we impose taxes on those goods. In particular, let the demand for goods one and two be defined as $Y_D^1 = M - p_1 + p_2$, and $Y_D^2 = M - p_2 + p_1$, and let the supply of the two goods be $Y_S^1 = p_1$, and $Y_S^2 = \Upsilon$, where $\Upsilon$ is a constant and $M > \Upsilon$. Think of $M$ as income. To reiterate, the indices 1 and 2 here denote different goods, not different consumers.

1. Are goods one and two gross complements or gross substitutes? Prove your answer mathematically referring to the definition of gross complements and substitutes. (5 points)

2. Provide economic intuition for the supply of good two: what does it mean when the supply of a good is constant, can you think of an example? (5 points)

3. Still on the supply of good 2: what is the price elasticity of supply for good 2? Is good two elastic or inelastic in supply? (5 points)

4. There are six unknowns in this economic system: $Y_D^1, Y_D^2, Y_S^1, Y_S^2, p_1, p_2$. Impose the equilibrium conditions $Y_D^1 = Y_S^1$ and $Y_D^2 = Y_S^2$ and solve for equilibrium prices and quantities in both markets. [Your answers should be in terms of $M$ and $\Upsilon$ since these are the only exogenous parameters in the system.] (4 points)

5. Discuss qualitatively why it makes sense (or not) that demand must equal supply in equilibrium (5 points)

6. Let’s do some comparative statics. How does $p_2$ respond to increase in the fixed supply $\Upsilon$? Discuss the intuition. Why does $p_1$ also respond to increase in $\Upsilon$, despite the fact that good 1 is not in short supply? (6 points)

7. More comparative statics. Why is the price for good 1 different from the price of good 2 despite the demand functions being symmetrical? [Make sure that your answer provides economic intuition rather than just mathematical intuition.] (5 points)

8. Final comparative statics: How does income $M$ affect the equilibrium prices and quantities? Provide intuition (5 points)

Now consider imposing a tax on good one. Instead of the per-unit tax we have considered in the past, this time we consider a per-dollar tax. The tax rate is $t \in [0, 1]$ and the total revenue generated by the tax is $t \cdot p_1 Y_1$. In other words, the tax is a proportion of the amount of money spent on good one. Thus, the price paid by consumers for good one is $(1 + t) p_1$ while the price received by producers is just $p_1$. [This is exactly like the sales tax we have in the US. Thus, in California, $t = .0975$. Do not use this number in your calculations. It is just an example.]

9. Write down the revised expressions for $Y_D^1, Y_D^2, Y_S^1$, and $Y_S^2$, taking into account taxes. [Hint: The expressions are the same as in point 4 above, but in the demand functions substitute $p_1$ with $p_1 (1 + t)$] Why do taxes not enter the expression of the supply function? (5 points)

10. Solve for the equilibrium prices and quantities for both goods. (4 points)

11. Compare the prices and quantities under this taxation scheme to your results from part 4. What is surprising about these results? Provide economic intuition for this surprising outcome. (10 points)

Now consider, instead, putting the tax $t$ on good two (and no tax on good 1). We will explore the implications of whether the tax is placed on good one or good two.

12. Write down the revised expressions for $Y_D^1, Y_D^2, Y_S^1$, and $Y_S^2$ and solve for the equilibrium prices and quantities of both goods. (6 points)
13. Compare the prices and quantities under this taxation scheme to your results from part 10. Who is harmed and/or helped by each of the schemes? Who pays the tax in each of the schemes? Provide as much economic intuition as possible for your answers, and in particular for the differences between the results for the two schemes. [Hint: your answers to parts 1 and 2 should play a prominent role in your answer to this part of the problem.] (10 points)