The Berkeley Center for Economics & Politics is proud to sponsor the Political Economy Research Lunch (PERL) and a presentation from:
Lucas Novaes
"Promiscuous Politicians and the Problem of Clientelistic Party Building"
12:30-2:00 pm
Monday, March 9, 2015
Moses Hall, Room 223
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract: Political brokers are essential to clientelistic parties, but they may be unreliable agents. In party systems with competing clientelistic parties, brokers' connections are valuable to multiple parties, and brokers may defect when presented with a superior proposal. When brokers switch, parties' local linkages erode. This article analyzes how limiting party switching helps parties build more stable linkages to voters. Until recently brokers in Brazil -- who also serve as local candidates -- frequently changed allegiances. However, an unexpected institutional reform discouraged brokers who had won local elections from switching. Using regression discontinuities designs, I show that compared to their losing counterparts, winning candidates became more dependable party intermediaries only after the ruling. Further, I identify that the exogenously set exit barriers improved prospects for parties unable to enforce loyalty on their own. My findings show that party switching is a cause and not merely a symptom of unstable parties in clientelistic systems.
To see a list of upcoming seminars visit: http://bcep.haas.berkeley.edu/PERL.html