@book {21906,
	title = {In Defense of Public Debt},
	year = {2021},
	abstract = {Public debts have exploded to levels unprecedented in modern history as governments responded to the Covid-19 pandemic and ensuing economic crisis. Their dramatic rise has prompted apocalyptic warnings about the dangers of heavy debts--about the drag they will place on economic growth and the burden
they represent for future generations. In Defense of Public Debt offers a sharp rejoinder to this view, marshaling the entire history of state-issued public debt to demonstrate its usefulness.

Authors Barry Eichengreen, Asmaa El-Ganainy, Rui Esteves, and Kris James Mitchener argue that the ability of governments to issue debt has played a critical role in addressing emergencies--from wars and pandemics to economic and financial crises, as well as in funding essential public goods and
services such as transportation, education, and healthcare. In these ways, the capacity to issue debt has been integral to state building and state survival. Transactions in public debt securities have also contributed to the development of private financial markets and, through this channel, to
modern economic growth.

None of this is to deny that debt problems, debt crises, and debt defaults occur. But these dramatic events, which attract much attention, are not the entire story. In Defense of Public Debt redresses the balance. The authors develop their arguments historically, recounting two millennia of public
debt experience. They deploy a comprehensive database to identify the factors behind rising public debts and the circumstances under which high debts are successfully stabilized and brought down. Finally, they bring the story up to date, describing the role of public debt in managing the Covid-19
pandemic and recession, suggesting a way forward once governments--now more heavily indebted than before--finally emerge from the crisis.},
	keywords = {Debt},
	author = {Barry Eichengreen and Asmaa El-Ganainy and Rui Esteves and Kris James Mitchener}
}
@book {17122,
	title = {The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era},
	year = {2018},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	abstract = {Populism of the right and left has spread like wildfire throughout the world. The impulse reached its apogee in the United States with the election of Trump, but it was a force in Europe ever since the Great Recession sent the European economy into a prolonged tailspin. In the simplest terms, populism is a political ideology that vilifies economic and political elites and instead lionizes {\textquoteright}the people.{\textquoteright} The people, populists of all stripes contend, need to retake power from the unaccountable elites who have left them powerless. And typically, populists{\textquoteright} distrust of elites shades into a catchall distrust of trained experts because of their perceived distance from and contempt for {\textquoteright}the people.{\textquoteright} Another signature element of populist movements is faith in a savior who can not only speak directly to the people, but also serve as a vessel for the plain people{\textquoteright}s hopes and dreams. Going back to the 1890s, a series of such saviors have come and gone in the US alone, from William Jennings Bryan to Huey Long to--finally--Donald Trump.

In The Populist Temptation, the eminent economic historian Barry Eichengreen focuses on the global resurgence of populism today and places it in a deep context. Alternating between the present and earlier populist waves from modern history, he argues that populists tend to thrive most in the wake of economic downturns, when it is easy to convince the masses of elite malfeasance. Yet while there is more than a grain of truth that bankers, financiers, and {\textquoteright}bought{\textquoteright} politicians are responsible for the mess, populists{\textquoteright} own solutions tend to be simplistic and economically counterproductive. Moreover, by arguing that the ordinary people are at the mercy of extra-national forces beyond their control--international capital, immigrants, cosmopolitan globalists--populists often degenerate into demagoguery and xenophobia. There is no one solution to addressing the concerns that populists raise, but Eichengreen argues that there is an obvious place to start: shoring up and improving the welfare state so that it is better able to act as a buffer for those who suffer most during economic slumps. For example, America{\textquoteright}s patchwork welfare state was not well equipped to deal with the economic fallout that attended globalization and the decline of manufacturing in America, and that played no small part in Trump{\textquoteright}s victory. Lucidly explaining both the appeals and dangers of populism across history, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not just the populist phenomenon, but more generally the lasting political fallout that follows in the wake of major economic crises.},
	author = {Barry Eichengreen}
}
@book {16320,
	title = {How Global Currencies Work},
	year = {2017},
	author = {Barry Eichengreen},
	editor = {Arnaud Mehl}
}
@book {9477,
	title = {Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, The Great Recession, and the Uses{\textemdash}and Misuses{\textemdash}of History},
	year = {2015},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	abstract = {<p>The Great Depression and the Great Recession are the two great economic crises of the past hundred years. While there are accounts of both episodes, no one has yet attempted a sustained comparative analysis. In Two Crises, Barry Eichengreen draws on his unparalleled expertise for a brilliantly conceived dual-track account of the two crises and their consequences. Rather than telling the stories of the two crises in sequence, instead he weaves them together. He describes the two bubble-fueled buildups, then the onset of crisis, the subsequent financial and economic and collapse, the policy response, and finally the recovery. A theme of Eichengreen{\textquoteright}s narrative is that while the policy response to the Great Recession was importantly shaped by perceptions of the Great Depression - contemporary policymakers did in fact learn lessons from the Depression that enabled them, this time, to prevent the worst - they could have done better. Their failure to do so reflected a tendency to take the lessons of the Depression too literally, leading to an inability to recognize important respects in which circumstances, and specifically the structure of financial markets, had changed - precisely in response to the policies put in place due to the Depression. In addition, success was the mother of failure: the success of the policy response took the wind out of reformers{\textquoteright} sails. It diminished support for the kind of far-reaching social and financial reforms adopted in the 1930s. It allowed policy makers and society to prematurely indulge their desire for a return to normal policies before a normal economy had been restored. To be sure, this more recent crisis was better managed than the earlier one, which resulted in widespread social distress and, in the worst case, the rise of fascism. But a wiser collective response after 2008 would have staved off the painfully slow growth that subsequently plagued the United States and Europe.</p>
},
	isbn = {9780199392001},
	url = {https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hall-of-mirrors-9780199392001},
	author = {Barry Eichengreen}
}
