Professor Yuliy Sannikov, sannikov@econ.berkeley.edu
Office Hours during the week preceding the final:
Mon 11am-noon and Thu 2-3 (note time change) in 593 Evans Hall
GSIs: Kristof P. Madarasz, madarasz@econ.berkeley.edu
Office Hours: Monday 9am-11am in 508-5 Evans
Office Hours: Wednesdays, 9am-11am in 508-3/508-5 Evans
Grading requirements:
3 problem sets: 20%
Final exam, Monday December 19, 2005, 12:30pm-3:30pm, 50 Birge: 80%
Optional readings:
Mas-Colell, A., M. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeonomic
Theory,
Introduction, Examples of Games
Normal Form Games, Nash Equilibrium
Extensive Form Games, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Games with Incomplete
Information, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Education Signaling and Intuitive Criterion
More on Signaling and Adverse Selection
Auctions, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Information
Additional Materials
Notes on “formalities” (New, not required for exam)
Detailed analysis of the entrant-incumbent game
Additional problems with solutions
Practice Final Exam 1, Solutions
Practice Final Exam 2, Solutions
Final Exam, Solutions